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Pragmatism By MOHAMMAD MARATIB ALI A web Islamic activist.
OUTLINES (Section -1)
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PRAGMATISM “A philosophical view that a theory or concept should be evaluated in terms of how it works and its consequences as the standard for action and thought”.
“School of
philosophy, dominant in the United States during the first
quarter of the 20th century, based on the principle that the
usefulness, workability, and practicality of ideas, policies,
and proposals are the criteria of their merit. It stresses the
priority of action over doctrine, of experience over fixed
principles, and it holds that ideas borrow their meanings from
their consequences and their truths from their verification.
Thus, ideas are essentially instruments and plans of action”
“A straight forward practical way of thinking about things or dealing with problems, concerned with results rather than with theories and principles”.
INTRODUCTION Pragmatism, philosophical movement that has had a major impact on American culture from the late 19th century to the present. Pragmatism calls for ideas and theories to be tested in practice, by assessing whether acting upon the idea or theory produces desirable or undesirable results. According to pragmatists, all claims about truth, knowledge, morality, and politics must be tested in this way. Pragmatism has been critical of traditional Western philosophy, especially the notion that there are absolute truths and absolute values. Although pragmatism was popular for a time in France, England, and Italy, most observers believe that it encapsulates an American faith in know-how and practicality and an equally American distrust of abstract theories and ideologies.
HISTORY OF
PRAGMATISM Antecedents in modern philosophy Pragmatism was a part of a general revolt against the overly intellectual, somewhat fastidious, and closed systems of Idealism in 19th-century philosophy. These boldly speculative Idealists had expanded man's subjective experience of mind until it became a metaphysical principle of cosmic explanation. To the Idealist, all of reality was one fabric, woven from parts that cohered by virtue of the internal relations that they bore to one another; and this reality was often interpreted in abstract and fixed intellectual categories. The theory of evolution, then still new, seemed to the Pragmatists, on the other hand, to call for a new, non-Idealist interpretation of nature, life, and reason-one that challenged the long-established conceptions of fixed species. The new emphasis was on the particular variations and struggles of life in adapting to the environment. Philosophically, the fact of growth and the development of techniques for instituting changes favorable to life became the significant factors rather than the Idealist's ambitious rationalistic account of human goals and of the universe in general, and important developments in natural science and logic also encouraged a critical attitude toward earlier systems. There were two main influences on the early formation of Pragmatism: One was the tradition of British Empiricism in the work of John Stuart Mill, Alexander Bain, and John Venn, which had stressed the role of experience in the genesis of knowledge-and particularly their analyses of belief as being intimately tied in with action and, indeed, as definable in terms of one's disposition and motive to act. The work of George Berkeley, an important 18th-century empirical Idealist, which presented a theory of the practical and inferential nature of knowledge, of sensations as signs (and thus predictive) of future experience, led Pierce to refer to him as “the introducer of Pragmatism.” The other major influence came from modern German philosophy: from Kant's analysis of the purposive character of belief and of the roles of will and desire in forming belief and his doctrine of “regulative ideas,” such as God or the Soul, which guide the understanding in achieving systematic completeness and unity of knowledge; from Romantic Idealists, for whom all reason is “practical” in expanding and enriching human experience; and from Hegel's historical and social conception of changing and developing subject matters. In sum, Pierce was profoundly impressed by Kant and by the Scottish philosophy of common sense, James by British Empiricism and by the voluntarisms (stressing the role of choice or will) of the genetic epistemologist James Ward and the relativistic French Persona list Charles Renouvier, Dewey by Coleridge's version of Kant's active conception of mind and by neo-Kantian and Hegelian Idealism. Finally, to these influences must be added that of American social experience in the 19th century: the rapid expansion of industry and trade and a popular optimism, with its roots in Puritan theology, holding that hard work and virtue are bound to be rewarded. Both the precariousness of frontier life, however, and the rapidly expanding economy weakened the prevailing Calvinistic belief in a predestined future and encouraged the emergence of inventiveness, a sense of living still in the New World experiment, and adoption of the ideal of “making good.”
THE CULTURAL ROOTS OF PRAGMATISM THE MOVEMENT in philosophy variously known as “pragmatism”, “instrumentalism”, and “experimentalism” is in a real sense an expression of American culture. The outstanding feature of this philosophy is its empirical character. It accepts ordinary human experience as the ultimate source and test of all knowledge and value. Its four founders -Charles S.Peirce (1839-1914), William James (1842-1910), John Dewey (1859-1952), and George H. Mead (1863-1931),--were all born in America. It is manifest in such characteristic pragmatic views as the following: 1- Thought is intrinsically connected with action 2- Theories and doctrines are working hypotheses and are to be tested by the consequences they produce in actual life-situations 3- Moral ideals are empty and sterile apart from attention to the means that are required to achieve them 4- Reality is not a static, completed system, but a process of unending change and transformation 5- Man is not a mere puppet of external forces, but through the use of intelligence can reshape the conditions that mold his own experience 6- Ordinary people can develop from within the context of their own on-going activities, all necessary institutions, and regulative principles and standards. 7- Men are oriented to the future not to the past. 8- Man could master the circumstances of life, and that change need not be feared as an “omen of decay”, but could be welcomed as a promise of social improvement. 9-
The tendency of pioneer
people like American has to judge both ideas and human beings
not primarily by their ancestry but rather by what they were
able to achieve in the context of actual life affairs. 10- The freedom, within certain rather rigid, but very wide boundaries of every aspect of life. 11- Democracy and
experimental science define procedures that make for the
liberation of the human intelligence.
MAJOR THESIS OF PRAGMATISM During the first quarter of the 20th century, Pragmatism was the most influential philosophy in America, exerting an impact on the study of law, education, political and social theory, art, and religion. Six fundamental theses of this philosophy can be distinguished. It is, however, unlikely that any one thinker would have subscribed to them all; and even on points of agreement, varying interpretations mark the thought and temper of the major Pragmatists. The six theses are: 1. Responsive to Idealism and evolutionary theory, Pragmatists have emphasized the “plastic” nature of reality and the practical function of knowledge as an instrument for adapting to reality and controlling it. Existence is fundamentally concerned with action, which some Pragmatists exalted to an almost metaphysical level. Changes being an inevitable condition of life, Pragmatists have called attention to the ways in which change can be directed for individual and social benefit. They have consequently been most critical of moral and metaphysical doctrines in which change and action are relegated to the “merely practical,” on the lowest level of the hierarchy of values. Some Pragmatists anticipated the more concrete and life-centered philosophy of Existentialism by arguing that only in acting-confronted with obstacles, compelled to make choices, and concerned to give form to experience-is man's being realized and discovered. 2. Pragmatism is a continuation of critical Empiricism in emphasizing the priority of actual experience over fixed principles and a priori reasoning in critical investigation. For James this meant that the Pragmatist Turns away from
abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a
priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and
pretended absolutes and origins. He turns towards concreteness
and adequacy, towards facts, towards action . . . . It means the
open air and possibilities of nature, as against . . . dogma,
artificiality, and the pretence of finality in truth. 3. The pragmatic meaning of an idea, belief, or proposition is said to reside in the distinct class of specific experimental or practical consequences that result from the use, application, or entertainment of the notion. As Pierce commented: “Our idea of anything is our idea of its sensible effects.” Two propositions for which no different effects can be discerned have merely a verbal appearance of dissimilarity, and a proposition for which no definite theoretical or practical consequences can be determined is pragmatically meaningless. For Pragmatists “there is no distinction of meaning so fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of practice.” Meaning thus has a predictive component, and some Pragmatists came close to identifying the meaning of a term or proposition with the process of its verification. 4. While most philosophers have defined truth in terms of a belief's “coherence” within a pattern of other beliefs or as the “correspondence” between a proposition and an actual state of affairs, Pragmatism has, in contrast, generally held that truth, like meaning, is to be found in the process of verification. Thus, truth is the verification of a proposition, or the successful working of an idea. Crudely, truth is “what works.” Less crudely and more theoretically, truth is in Pearce’s words, the “limit towards which endless investigation would tend to bring scientific belief.” For John Dewey, founder of the “Instrumentalist” school of Pragmatism, these are beliefs “warranted” by inquiry. 5. In keeping with their understanding of meaning and truth, Pragmatists have interpreted ideas as instruments and plans of action. In contrast to the conception of ideas as images and copies of impressions or of external objects, Pragmatist theories have emphasized the functional character of ideas: ideas are suggestions and anticipations of possible conduct; they are hypotheses or forecasts of what will result from a given action; they are ways of organizing behavior in the world rather than replicas of the world. Ideas are thus analogous in some respects to tools; they are efficient, useful, and valuable, or not, depending on the role that they play in contributing to the successful direction of behavior. 6. In methodology, Pragmatism is a broad philosophical attitude toward the formation of concepts, hypotheses, and theories and their justification. To Pragmatists man's interpretations of reality are motivated and justified by considerations of efficacy and utility in serving his interests and needs; the molding of language and theorizing are likewise subject to the critical objective of maximum usefulness according to man's various purposes.
PIERCE CHARLES SENDALS AND
PRAGMATISM Peirce's Pragmatism was first elaborated in a series of “Illustrations of the Logic of Science” in the Popular Science Monthly in 1877-78. The scientific method, he argued, is one of several ways of fixing beliefs. Beliefs are essentially habits of action. It is characteristic of the method of science that it makes its ideas clear in terms first of the sensible effects of their objects, and second of habits of action adjusted to those effects. Here, for example, is how the mineralogist makes the idea of hardness clear: the sensible effect of x being harder than y is that x will scratch y and not be scratched by it; and believing that x is harder than y means habitually using x to scratch y (as in dividing a sheet of glass) and keeping x away from y when y is to remain unscratched. By the same method, Peirce tried to give equal clarity to the much more complex, difficult, and important idea of probability. In his Harvard lectures of 1903, he identified Pragmatism more narrowly with the logic of abduction. Even his evolutionary metaphysics of 1891-93 was a higher order-working hypothesis by which the special sciences might be guided in forming their lower order hypotheses; thus, his more metaphysical writings, with their emphases on chance and continuity, were but further illustrations of the logic of science. When Pragmatism became a popular movement in the early 1900s, Pierce was dissatisfied both with all of the forms of Pragmatism then current and with his own original exposition of it, and his last productive years were devoted in large part to its radical revision and systematic completion and to the proof of the principle of what he by then had come to call “pragmaticism.” His “one contribution to philosophy,” he thought, was his “new list of categories” analogous to Kant's a priori forms of the understanding, which he reduced from 12 to 3: Quality, Relation, and Representation. In later writings he sometimes called them Quality, Reaction, and Mediation; and finally, Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. At first, he called them concepts; later, irreducible elements of concepts-the univalent, bivalent, and trivalent elements. They appear in that order, for example, in his division of the modalities into possibility, actuality, and necessity; in his division of signs into icons, indexes, and symbols; in the division of symbols into terms, propositions, and arguments; and in his division of arguments into abductions, inductions, and deductions. The primary function of the new list was to give systematic support to this last division. Pierce was twice married: first in 1862 to Harriet Melusina Fay, who left him in 1876 and second in 1883 to Juliet Pourtalai (née Froissy). There were no children of either marriage. For the last 26 years of his life, he and Juliet lived on a farm on the Delaware River near Milford, Pa. He called himself a bucolic logician, a recluse for logic's sake. He lived his last years in serious illness and in abject poverty relieved only by aid from such friends as William James. Significance. Pierce is now
recognized as the most original and the most versatile intellect
that the Americas have so far produced. The recognition was slow
in coming, however, and much of his work is still known only to
specialists, each grasping a small part of it, severed from its
connections with the rest. Even his Pragmatism is
viewed in relation to that of other Pragmatists rather than to
other parts of his own work. A philosopher will know him also
for his evolutionary metaphysics (theory of basic reality) of
chance and continuity. A mathematician may know him for his
contributions to linear algebra. A logician will know him as one
of the creators of the algebra of logic-including the logic of
relations; quantification theory (on the usages of “every . . .
”, “no . . . ”, and “some . . . ”); and three-valued logic,
which admits a third truth value between true and false-and may
know him also for his two systems of logical graphs, which he
called entitative and existential. A psychologist may discover
in him the first modern psychologist in the United States. A
worker in semiotics will know him as co-founder of that science.
A philologist may encounter him as an authority on the
pronunciation of Elizabethan English. A computer scientist may
find in one of his letters the first known sketch of the design
and theory of an electric switching-circuit computer. But all of
this, and much besides, lay beyond the scope of his professional
career. FEATURES OF PRAGMATISM Pragmatists regard all theories and institutions as tentative hypotheses and solutions. For this reason, they believed that efforts to improve society, through such means as education or politics, must be geared toward problem solving and must be ongoing. Through their emphasis on connecting theory to practice, pragmatist thinkers attempted to transform all areas of philosophy, from metaphysics to ethics and political philosophy. Pragmatism sought a middle ground between traditional ideas about the nature of reality and radical theories of nihilism and irrationalism, which had become popular in Europe in the late 19th century. Traditional metaphysics assumed that the world has a fixed, intelligible structure and that human beings can know absolute or objective truths about the world and about what constitutes moral behavior. Nihilism and irrationalism, on the other hand, denied those very assumptions and their certitude. Pragmatists today still try to steer a middle course between contemporary offshoots of these two extremes. The ideas of the pragmatists were considered revolutionary when they first appeared. To some critics, pragmatism’s refusal to affirm any absolutes carried negative implications for society. For example, pragmatists do not believe that a single absolute idea of goodness or justice exists, but rather that these concepts are changeable and depend on the context in which they are being discussed. The absence of these absolutes, critics feared, could result in a decline in moral standards. The pragmatists’ denial of absolutes, moreover, challenged the foundations of religion, government, and schools of thought. As a result, pragmatism influenced developments in psychology, sociology, education, semiotics (the study of signs and symbols), and scientific method, as well as philosophy, cultural criticism, and social reform movements. Various political groups have also drawn on the assumptions of pragmatism, from the progressive movements of the early 20th century to later experiments in social reform.
PHILOSOPHIES INFLUENCED BY PRAGMATISM CHINESE PHILOSOPHY The Western philosophies most influential in 20th-century China have been pragmatism and materialism. The former, illustrated in the writings of Hu Shi, a student of the American philosopher John Dewey, conceived of ideas as instruments to cope with actual situations and emphasized results. It was therefore well suited for a philosophy of reform, and it played an important role in the New Culture Movement (begun in 1917), which sought to modernize Chinese social and intellectual life. By 1924, however, pragmatism began to decline in popularity, probably because it lacked an integrated political philosophy. Materialism in China has consisted primarily of dialectical materialism, as described by Karl Marx, whose works became widely known in China about 1919. Materialism has been the moving power in Chinese economic reconstruction, and since the late 1920s, historical materialism (the economic interpretation of history) has gained wide acceptance even among some non-Communist philosophers. Most of the materialists eventually accepted Marxism-Leninism, the orthodox philosophy of the Chinese Communist Party, enunciated by Mao Zedong. Although the Chinese Communists have claimed that Mao's beliefs were a further development of Marxism-Leninism, a careful analysis shows that Mao's originality was not so much theoretical as practical. (D-web) INSTRUEMENTALISM & PRAGMATISM Instrumentalism also called experimentalism a philosophy
advanced by the American philosopher John Dewey holding that
what is most important in a thing or idea is its value as an
instrument of action and that the truth of an idea lies in its
usefulness. Dewey favored these terms over the term
pragmatism to label the philosophy on which his views of
education rested. His school claimed that cognition has evolved
not for speculative or metaphysical purposes but for the
practical purpose of successful adjustment. Ideas are conceived
as instruments for transforming the uneasiness arising from
facing a problem into the satisfaction of solving it.
IRRATIONALISM AND PRAGMATISM A 19th- and early 20th-century philosophical trend that claimed to enrich man's apprehension of life by expanding it beyond the rational or pragmatic to its fuller dimensions. Irrationalism
found much in the life of the spirit and in human history that
could not be dealt with by the rational methods of science.
Under the influence of Charles Darwin and later Sigmund Freud,
irrationalism began to explore the biological and subconscious
roots of experience. Pragmatism, existentialism,
and vitalism (or “life philosophy”) all arose as expressions of
this expanded view of human life and
thought. PRAGMATISM WITH ETHICS In his late
19th-century and early 20th-century writings, the American
philosopher and psychologist William James anticipated Freud and
Pavlov to some extent. James is best known as the founder of
pragmatism, which maintains that the value of ideas
is determined by their consequences. His greatest contribution
to ethical theory, however, lies in his insistence on the
importance of interrelationships, in ideas as in other
phenomena. PRAGMATISM WITH METAPHYSICS It denies metaphysics absolutely. Its ten propositions are as follows: 1- The World is all foregrounds. 2- The World is “characterized throughout by process and change." 3- The World is precarious. 4- The World is incomplete and indeterminate. 5- The World is pluralistic. 6- The World has ends within its own process. 7- The World in not, nor does it include, a transempirical reality. 8- Man is continous with the world. 9- Man is not an active cause in the world. 10- The World
does not guarantee progress. Since the
formation of the hypothesis of absolute idealism, the
development of metaphysics has resulted in as many types of
metaphysical theory as existed in pre-Kantian philosophy,
despite Kant's contention that he had fixed definitely the
limits of philosophical speculation. Notable among these later
metaphysical theories are radical empiricism, or
pragmatism, a native American form of metaphysics
expounded by Charles Sanders Pierce, developed by William James,
and adapted as instrumentalism by John Dewey; voluntarism, the
foremost exponents of which are the German philosopher Arthur
Schopenhauer and the American philosopher Josiah Royce;
phenomenalism, as it is exemplified in the writings of the
French philosopher Auguste Comte and the British philosopher
Herbert Spencer; emergent evolution, or creative evolution,
originated by the French philosopher Henri Bergson; and the
philosophy of the organism, elaborated by the British
mathematician and philosopher Alfred North Whitehead. The
salient doctrines of pragmatism are that the chief
function of thought is to guide action, that the meaning of
concepts is to be sought in their practical applications, and
the practical effects of belief should test that truth;
according to instrumentalism, ideas are instruments of action,
and their truth is determined by their role in human experience.
In the theory of voluntarism, the will is postulated as the
supreme manifestation of reality. The exponents of phenomenalism,
who are sometimes called positivists, contend that everything
can be analyzed in terms of actual or possible occurrences, or
phenomena, and that anything that cannot be analyzed in this
manner cannot be understood. In emergent or creative evolution,
the evolutionary process is characterized as spontaneous and
unpredictable rather than mechanistically determined. The
philosophy of the organism combines an evolutionary stress on
constant process with a metaphysical theory of God, the eternal
objects, and creativity. (D-web) PRAGMATISM WITH TRUTH In the late 19th-century American philosopher Charles S. Pierce offered another answer to the question “What is truth?” He asserted that truth is that which experts will agree upon when their investigations are final. Many pragmatists such as Pierce claim that the truth of our ideas must be tested through practice. Some pragmatists have gone so far as to question the usefulness of the idea of truth, arguing that in evaluating our beliefs we should rather pay attention to the consequences that our beliefs may have. However, critics of the pragmatic theory are not concerned that we would have no knowledge because we do not know which set of beliefs will ultimately be agreed upon; nor are there sets of beliefs that are useful in every context. (D-web)
McDermid, Douglas. "Pragmatism
and Truth: The Comparison Objection to Correspondence." Review
of Metaphysics 51.4 (December 1998):775-811. PRAGMATISM WITH WILL Most other philosophers have regarded the will as coequal or secondary to other aspects of personality. Plato believed that the psyche is divided into three parts: reason, will, and desire. For rationalist philosophers, such as Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, and René Descartes, the will is the agent of the rational soul in governing purely animal appetites and passions. Some empirical philosophers, such as David Hume, discount the importance of rational influences upon the will; they think of the will as ruled mainly by emotion. Evolutionary philosophers, such as Herbert Spencer, and pragmatist philosophers, such as John Dewey, conceive the will not as an innate faculty but as a product of experience evolving gradually as the mind and personality of the individual develop in social interaction. (D-web) EMPIRICISM AND PRAGMATISM The Hegelian school, very influential in the 19th century, entered a period of rapid decline in the early part of the 20th. The common sense and scientifically oriented philosophy of the English scholars G.E. Moore (1873-1958) and Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) introduced a period of Empiricism in Britain, while William James's Pragmatism had a similar effect in America. Theologically, there was an antimetaphysical revolution during and after World War I. On the continent of Europe, the increasing influence of Existentialism was hostile to the old type of metaphysics. British Empiricism was expressed very strongly in Logical Positivism (maintaining the exclusive value of scientific knowledge and the denial of traditional metaphysical doctrines) and its linguistic aftermath. This stimulated the analysis of religious language, and the movement was complicated by the transformation in the thought of the Austrian-English philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951), who in his later thought was very far removed from his early, rather formalistic treatment of language. Theoretically,
the Analytic attempt to exhibit the nature of religious language
could have been a chiefly descriptive task, but, in fact, most
analyses have occurred in the context of questions of truth-thus
some scholars have been concerned with exhibiting how it is
possible to hold religious beliefs in an Empiricist framework,
and others with showing the meaninglessness or incoherence of
belief. A landmark was the publication, in 1955, of New Essays
in Philosophical Theology, edited by the English philosophers
A.G.N. Flew and A. MacIntyre. Though Wittgenstein stressed the
idea of “forms of life,” according to which the meaning of
religious beliefs would have to be given a practical and living
contextualization, little has been done to pursue the idea
empirically. The discovery by the English philosopher J.L.
Austin (1911-60) and others of performative uses of language has
stimulated some enquiry in this direction. Overall, however, the
Analytic philosophy of religion has been pursued rather
independently of the descriptive study and history of
religion. EDUCATION IN 20TH CENTURY (Major intellectual movements OR Traditional movements) Against the various “progressive” lines of 20th-century education, there have been strong voices advocating older traditions. These voices were particularly strong in the 1930s, in the 1950s, and again in the 1980s. Essentialists stress those human experiences that they believe are indispensable to people living today or at any time. They favor the “mental disciplines” and, in the matter of method and content, put effort above interest, subjects above activities, collective experience above that of the individual, logical organization above the psychological, and the teacher's initiative above that of the learner. Closely related to essentialism is what used to be called humanistic, or liberal, education in its traditional form? Although many intellectuals have argued the case, Robert M. Hutchins, president and then chancellor of the University of Chicago from 1929 to 1951, and Mortimer J. Adler, professor of the philosophy of law at the same institution, are its most recognized proponents. Adler argued for the restoration of an Aristotelian viewpoint in education. Maintaining that there are unchanging verities, he sought a return to education fixed in content and aim. Hutchins denounced American higher education for its vocationalism and “anti-intellectualism,” as well as for its delight in minute and isolated specialization. He and his colleagues urged a return to the cultivation of the intellect. Opposed to the fundamental tenets of pragmatism is the philosophy that underlies all Roman Catholic education. Theocentric in its viewpoint, Catholic scholasticism has God as its unchanging basis of action. It insists that without such a basis, there can be no real aim to any type of living, and hence there can be no real purpose in any system of education. The church's Everything in education-content, method, discipline-must lead in the direction of man's supernatural destiny. New foundations The three
concerns that guided the development of 20th-century education
were the child, science, and society. So-called progressive
education movements supporting child-centered education,
scientific-realist education, and social reconstruction laid the
foundations for this trilogy.
PRAGMATISM AND AMERICAN EDUCATION As Pragmatic approach in all aspect, is root of American life so, in no sphere of American life has the influence of pragmatism been greater than in that of education. Our democratic ideal of equality of opportunity as well as our faith in the possibility of a system of self-government has been associated with our program of universal education. As many have remarked, the American faith in education is fundamental, and the system of public education is one of our major institutions. Since the leaders of pragmatism were all directly involved in the work of the universities of our country it was natural that they should have an interest in education .But their concern with education had deeper roots; it was a direct outgrowth of their pragmatic philosophy. That has why there is real ground for the assertion of Professor Perry that “of pragmatism it can be said, as it can be said of no other philosophical school, that it was and is distinctively American”. (B-p.3-10) Operational For the
pragmatists, the scientific or experimental method of developing
and verifying meanings, the evolutionary conception of mind as a
distinctive mode of functioning in an evolving and qualitatively
diversified environment, and the view of democracy as a mode of
cooperative living carried on by human beings and for human
beings, all combine to emphasize the importance of a functional
curriculum in which the young acquire and test both scientific
and moral meanings through their own purposeful group
activities. They believe that it is through such wholehearted
purposeful living that the young learn to become persons and to
achieve the attitudes and the understandings that are required
to make a life of freedom possible. The growth of each pupil is
the end, and this end is to be achieved not by the assimilation
of some predetermined pattern of human living, but by a process
of experience-inquiry-learning in which old meanings and habits
are continuously reconstructed to extend powers of control and
to enrich the significance of existence. Education is growth and
growth has no end other than more growth.
In the same book Pragmatist William H. Kilpatrick, believe “Education for character through the purposeful act”. In the best sense of words, progressive education and work of Dr. Kilpatrick are virtually synonymous. I say in the best sense because the phrase “progressive education” has been and is frequently used to signify almost any kind of school theory and practice that departs from previously established scholastic methods. (B-p.179) A group of people has posed that the pragmatic theory is itself defective, or at least in need of important modification and supplementation. One of the most important criticisms comes from those who hold that the pragmatists have given undue place to the method of experimental science in their educational program. This group does not accept the pragmatic view that pattern of experimental inquiry defines the general method of intelligence and should therefore be foundational in all aspects of the school program. It contends rather that experimental procedures are relevant and valid when our interest is in the discovery of facts or in the mere description of an existing state of affairs, but that another and quite different method is required when we are concerned to make value judgments, particularly judgments about questions of policy. It believes that the exclusive emphasis of the of the pragmatists on experimental procedures in the school has had unfortunate consequences for democratic interests, because it has meant that insufficient attention has been given to preparation of the young for their moral responsibilities as future citizens of a free and self-governing society. Obviously, a program of education cannot be considered adequate which does not provide opportunity for the young to have experience in the process of making value judgments. Hence, this group insists that emphasis on the discipline of “practical judgment” -the discipline of making value judgments-should be given a central place in the work of the school. Another challenge is advanced by a certain religious group who believe that the educational program of pragmatism is either indifferent or hostile to the cultivation of religious attitude and allegiances in the young. This denotes something of a change in attitude on the part of these groups for there was period when many religious leaders were ardent supporters of the outlook and method of pragmatism. This was particularly true of those religious forces who desired to harmonize religious interests and beliefs with scientific procedures and attitudes. They believed that the pragmatic conception of experience as the source and test of meaning had provided the means by which the distinctive values of religion could be made a subject of empirical study and validation. Those engaged in religious education were also attracted to the pragmatic principle of the development of character through purposeful group activity, for they were becoming increasingly doubtful of the moral worth of the traditional program with its stress on the dogmatic and the verbal. But, today, both “liberals” and “fundamentalists” in religion are also associated in an attack on what they increasingly designate as “secularist” tendencies in contemporary life and education. It is difficult to judge how long this reaction in theology will continue. (B-p.177-8) On another
occausion,Counts emphasize that it is a mistake to assume that
scientific procedures is prized because it is a process by which
the mind can be kept forever open and empty. He agrees with
Pierce that scientific method is prized rather because it is the
most satisfactory means man has discovered for “establishing”
beliefs and thereby clothing the mind with dependable
beliefs. In the result of a criticism, George Counts, as a pragmatist, is in full accord with it and says “I believe firmly
that a critical factor must play an important role in any
educational program, at least in any such program fashioned for
the modern world. An education that does not strive to promote
the fullest and most thorough understanding of the world is not
worthy of the name. Also there must be no deliberate distortion
or suppression of facts to support any theory or point of
view”. SALIENT FEATURES IN THE PRAGMATIC THEORY OF EDUCATION Here is summary of the three great pragmatists, Kilpatrick, Counts, and Bode points of views,
Waks,
Leonard J. "Post-experimentalist pragmatism."
Studies in Philosophy and Education 17.1 (January 1998): 17-28.
CONSEQUENCES OF PRAGMATISM (By Rorty) Rorty began as an
advocate of linguistic philosophy (see Analytic and Linguistic
Philosophy), believing that the tools of logic and the careful
analysis of language could provide answers to most philosophical
questions. His anthology, The Linguistic Turn (1967), played a
major role in defining linguistic philosophy for an entire
generation. Rorty later became one of that movement’s most
incisive critics. In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979),
he mounted a sustained critique of the idea that the mind
mirrors or provides a representation of external reality, or
nature. This concept, known as the correspondence theory of
truth, is central to linguistic philosophy. In Consequences of
Pragmatism (1982), Rorty abandoned the search for
unshakable foundations for human knowledge, a pursuit that has
characterized most philosophy since 17th-century French
philosopher René Descartes. Instead, Rorty came to favor a
pragmatic conception of truth (see Pragmatism)
that emphasizes the role of the individual in attaining
knowledge, at least in part, within the context of various
actions. Historical knowledge, for example, is not simply the
accumulation of observed facts about the past; rather, it
represents an examination of the past that is shaped according
to current concerns, such as human rights or individual
autonomy. The past is fashioned along the lines of present,
pragmatic concerns. STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF PRAGAMTISM: The strengths of pragmatism 1- The philosophy of pragmatism may offer some wise counsel for day-by-day living which may help maintain mental health. This counsel is that we live through one experience at a time. Whatever experiences are in the past, are in the past; and they relate to the present experience only to the extent that they provide resource for effectiveness in the present experience. Future experience are yet unformed; they grow out of the present experience and their character is determined to some extent by the success with which we cope with the experience which immediately confronts us. Therefore, the only wise practical “realism” is to give ourselves fully to each present experience and make the most of it. For those who dwell so much in the past or the subject to such constant apprehension about what the future may bring that they are confused about and inadequate for the demands of present experience, the counsel of pragmatism to take one step at a time may help bring clarity. This is also the counsel, it so happens of religious faith. 2- While
there is something quite radical in the pragmatic correction
of rationalism and empiricism, and corresponding reform
proposed for logic, there are some penetrating insights in
this correction, which may prove to be helpful. Conventional
induction and deduction are inadequate tools of knowledge
and need to be supplemented, at least, by methods more
closely matching the vitality of experience. Possibly, they
need to be supplemented by entirely new methods.
Experimentation offers some promise as providing a part of
the supplement needed and indicating the character of the
reform; but it will not be inadequate in itself. 3- There is much value in the power of pragmatism to keep us close to experience and to shelter for us the artificiality of the cloistered and formally academic. It carries the student along rather convincingly, once he has begun to catch some of the insights offered. But this adequacy to experience is almost completely descriptive, in the last analysis. Pragmatism helps to discern the ways of experience and offers some resource in the control of experience. It offers also some measure of possession of the essence of life. But it does not give us possession of any enduring essence, nor does it tell us how to be established in an abiding existence. 4- Pragmatism’s contribution to education is notable. While a purely pragmatic education has its limitations, pragmatic thought has lent insights because of which education will never be able to retreat to what it was formely, short of the resurgence of some tyranny, which takes away all freedoms. Truly educative happenings cannot be equated with what the teacher does, with class sessions, courses of study, schedules, nor has any of the other formal accouterments of educational institutions; and pragmatism helped us to see this. In helping us to discern the cycles of experience, it has also given us sensitivity to the cycles of learning. THE WEEKNESSES OF PRAGMATISM 1- Although, as has just been said, pragmatism may be somewhat acceptable as a description of life, it is not satisfactory as a way of representing essence and existence to us. It has the peculiar genius of the following the ways of spirit without believing in the existence of spirit and possessing its essence. 2- There is a sence in which experimental method is arbitrarily applied, at least to some situations, by the philosophy of pragmatism. Although experimental method is supposed to be applied individually to each new situation, the application seems sometimes to be forced, arbitrary and formal. May there not be situations to which some other methods might be more particularly applicable? In addition, do we not, on occasion, initiate some action, which directs events over a long time range, quite a part from a pressing problem, which forces us to act? 3- Can we find a way out of all intermediate situations? Of course, pragmatism does not say that we can, we may and we may not, however the only thing we can do is to try. But is there sufficient basis of hope for effective action, in the power of control or direction that we ourselves have, either as individuals or as societies in the pattern of events, which we have done nothing to produce? That is to say that the unexpected in experience sometimes delvers us, not always posing difficulties for us, thereby evidencing a watchful providence. 4- Again, are meanings strictly operational in character? Are they not, however, closely identified with objects and events, grounded more basically in mind? It may be granted that individual minds need the counterpart in raw stuff with which to operate, in order for there to be any meaning. But how can these meanings come to be unless there is some mind to conceive them? 5- There is any overemphasis on individuation in pragmatism. While this lends concreteness and particularity to its dealings, it does not do justice to the elements common too many experiences, and especially to the universality of mind in all experience. The result is radical pluralism and discontinuity in its metaphysics and ontology. While there is continuity in its epistemology and social theory, there is multiplicity and discontinuity in almost every other realm of its thought. 6- This leads on to the further objection that there is a philosophical incompleteness in the lack of an overarching unity in pragmatism. As a point of view, it does have a good bit more unity than the naive opportunism, which regards life as just one thing after another; but it does not go far enough in the attaining the true genius of a philosophy, offering ultimate, interrelatedness, and meaning. 7- Pragmatism is too radically agnostic. It unnecessarily reduces the continuity of man and Nature to the level of Nature; for this continuity actually suggests just as much that nature is the product of same kind of spirit as is found in man. The result is a representation of man in which he is scarcely to be recognized; he is a piece of society , one who thinks because the first learned the use of words from society, one who thinks because he first learned notself, agency and responsibility from society. 8- Pragmatism is also too radically negative in its ontology it actually gives us no meaning at all for the word is. Every thing is described as operational; everything is in motion. When anything is, it is in operation. But there must be more meaning than this in word is. True enough; the meaning cannot be supplied by a static, inert, impersonal existence, as in naturalism and some realism. Pragmatism quite effectively opposes this kind of description of existence. But ultimate meaning is provided by the category of spirit. For in spirit is motion, change, freedom, life, vitality, all of these things; but in edition, existence. Pragmatism is unsuccessful in trying to divorce the ways of spirit from the existence and essence of spirit. 9- The question may be asked at this point; just how much married is there in the original pragmatic idea? Do the consequences following from an idea or object, when put in operation in the flow of events, constitute its essence? Is it not rather true that these consequences are the representations or evidences of essence, instead of the essence itself? 10- Further, the individual - social life processes is not a sufficient existence base for values, as proposed in the philosophy of pragmatism. Now some values do have their bases of existence in this processes. This is the bases of existence for evil and ultimately unwanted values; it is also the foundation it is also the foundation for many adulterated values, mixed good and evil, and approximate goods. But it is not the existence base for the ultimate good, of which the values, which emerged in the life process, are only approximations. The tares will not grow forever, and the bad wheat will not thrive forever either but some day there will be a harvest in which there will be nothing but the good wheat, good because it partakes only of Him who ultimate good. 11- While it must be recognized that the pragmatic ethics is not a low-level pleasure-seeking ethics, its adequacy must still be questioned. Many people who profess themselves holier than the devotees of this philosophy would experience some improvement it they humbled themselves to learn from the pragmatists. But the question still remains as to whether a situational standard of satisfactoriness does justice to the personal-spiritual elements in every moral situation. Need not moral value be satisfactory to the ultimate requirements of selfhood, both individually and collectively in a society of selves, in addition to being satisfactory to the situation in which it is relevant? 12- To turn to another value realm, it does not seem to me that Dewey gives enough places in his aesthetics to negative values. Aesthetic value is not all beauty but involves other qualities as well, even positive contradictions of beauty. True enough, we may prefer the positive aesthetic values, yet we do have appreciation for art which is able to preserve for us the qualities of suffering, anguish, despair, ugliness, deceit, cowardice, ambition, haughtiness, etc. 13- In education, the conception of the pupil, like the conception of the self in a more general context, is not satisfactory. Pupils are more than social-vocal phenomena, selves who have their selfhood only because of their give-and-take with society. There is a distinction, which may be helpful at this point. While we come into our consciousness of selfhood only by our communication with objects, other selves, and society, this relation does not constitute the existence and essence of selfhood. How could there be words without thoughts to be expressed in them? How could there be thoughts to be communicated apart from thinking selves? Individual selves are not entities which can thrive in isolation; but their potentiality, made actual in social relations, is prior to and more than the social relation in which it is expressed and realized. 14- In education, again, the general objective should include more than social efficiency. It is well to redefine social efficiency so that it includes all that culture or the liberal arts now connote. There may be a gain in redefining culture so that it includes all that social efficiency now connotes. Certainly, everything that can be done in the direction of resolving this dualism is desirable. But social efficiency only does justice to social aspects of selfhood. In addition, the objective of education, while it certainly must be social, should do justice to the ultimate ends of selfhood. It should therefore include in its perspective the fullest realization of the self and the ultimate society of ends in which the self finds its true home. 15- Still further in education, it may be said that, just as experimental method is applied a bit more universally and arbitrarily by pragmatists than is warranted, so also it is applied too universally and arbitrarily as educational method. Its value should not be overlooked, indeed cannot be gainsaid; a great contribution has been made to educational method by pragmatism. But there are other general methods, which are both relevant and effective in education; two will be mentioned. There is method in providing the occasion and inspiration for a self to launch out on its own because it is creatively interested, apart from a pressing indeterminacy, which needs to be solved. In addition, there is a place for the use of the inner pressure of dialectical tension, in which it is not an experimental situation, which needs resolution, but rather alternative principles, or ways, or life commitments, which challenge initiative by their demand for decision. 16- The last comment concerning weaknesses in the philosophy of pragmatism has to do with its redefinition of religion. In fact, much the same criticism applies to the pragmatic treatment of religion as to the naturalist treatment. Pragmatists show wisdom in pointing to certain attitudes in religious devotion, which are needed for effective lying. Many of us who are more conventionally religious would benefit much if we were to get the insight into the fact-value distinction which pragmatism stresses so much. If that were to happen, more religious living would be a thrust into the future, instead of being devoted to preserving the status quo, as is more often the case than it should be. (A- p.508-514) WHAT MAKES A GREAT PRESIDENT? (PRAGMATISM) What are the elements of presidential greatness? Historian Robert Dallek argues that there are six key qualities in presidential success: activism, vision, pragmatism, charisma, consensus building, and credibility. Luck also plays a part, in Dallek’s view, but the country’s greatest presidents have managed to make their mark even when circumstances seemed to conspire against them. Although all great presidents have been visionaries, they have also served the office as sensible realists or instrumentalists, as leaders who understood that political accomplishments often required flexibility of means to reach desirable ends. In a nation composed of a vast array of competing interests, presidential success has always depended at least partially on compromise with determined opponents. The corollary to the proposition that presidents without vision will perish is that without a chief executive, little, if anything, can achieve the right balance of political give and take. Successful presidents have always realized that they could not get very far without constantly accommodating to change-change in events, change in mood, change in ideas, change that offered opportunities to advance American interests. Nineteenth-century American essayist Ralph Waldo Emerson may have captured this spirit best when he wrote, "I simply experiment, an endless seeker, with no Past at my back." Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt were surely two of America’s most successful pragmatic political leaders. In 1864, Lincoln wrote privately about the Emancipation Proclamation, "I claim not to have controlled events, but confess plainly that events have controlled me." Franklin Roosevelt was, in the words of his presidential predecessor Herbert Hoover, "a chameleon on plaid." His New Deal, as Roosevelt himself described it, was a series of experiments. The minefield of national politics is strewn with presidents who were too ideological to bend and make concessions, such as Hoover and Andrew Johnson. Others were so lacking in political direction that their administrations faltered under the burden of their drift and lack of initiative. Examples include John Tyler, Millard Fillmore, Rutherford B. Hayes, Taft, Harding, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter. The leaders who
survived and prospered in the White House have been those who
had the keenest political sense. This sense required the
presidents to combine a clear understanding of their goals with
both a carefully judged assessment of what degree of change the
country was ready to accept, and a strategic sense of when to
accommodate themselves to opponents who were ready to yield on
significant points. Without this skill, presidents have set
their objectives too low, or expended all their political
capital in hopeless battles. PRAGMATISM AND RELIGION There is more than theoretical relevancy in giving some attention to such a redefinition of religion as attempted by pragmatism. For the pragmatists in religion are not straw men. There are both leaders in religion and adherents who have taken the pragmatism of Dewey seriously; and when they speak for religion, through the terms they use may be conventional, their meanings are closer to Dewey's meanings than they are to traditional religion. THE STATUS OF RELIGION Pragmatist James took experience of the reality of the unseen as the beginning point in philosophy of religion. Religion consists, he said “of the belief that there is an unseen order, and that our supreme good lies in harmoniously adjusting ourselves thereto." On the other hand, Dewey, in his book, A Common Faith, he says “One of the sources of difficulty, I have contended, is preoccupation with the supernatural." As over this complexity, he finds religious attitudes, or possibly, we should say religious values, to be desirable. And he lends his weight to a modernized treatment of religion in which the focus is the realizing of religious values rather than adjustment to the supernatural. In short, the
status of religion in this: allied with it is experimental
values, which are worth-while, and should be preserved, but
there is no supernatural base for religious
experience. THE NATURE OF GOD As William James was virtually a realist in religion, finding God in immediate experiences of the presence of the unseen, he was not all attracted by rationalistic arguments for theistic belief. In addition, John Dewey relinquishes at the outset all conception of God as supernatural; he stands opposed to any apologetic for belief in the supernatural. Corresponding
to comparison already made between James and Dewey, their
conceptions of God are far removed from one another. James
was really a polytheist. His love for the openness of
pluralism in philosophy emerged in his religion as learning
toward belief in several gods who are higher and more
powerful than man, but yet finite and limited. Unlike the
scholars whom james termed " refined supernaturalists", he
had much in common with popular religion in which God and
angels, devils and demons, are dramatically opposed to one
another in a precariously decisive world there man's actions
have some cosmic weight in determining what the final
results shall be. James says that " All the facts of
religious experience require is that there be a larger power
which is friendly to man and his ideals, and which is
capable of this trust for the next step." THE NATURE OF MAN Pragmatism has the same confidence in man that it has in Nature, for it regards man as an integral part of Nature and perfectly continuous with it. It is quiet clear that the current pragmatism, influenced more by Dewey than by James, is not pessimistic about man. Pragmatists hold that such pessimism is unwarranted by the more accurate and analytical understanding of man which science has given us. Furthermore, it is felt, its original motivation was to put man in such a bad light that it would be recognized at once that supernatural means could be his only salvation. While pragmatism's rejection of pessimism about man is commonly recognized, it is not nearly such common knowledge that pragmatism does not swing to the opposite extreme of romantic optimism. Man is by no means of pure sweetness and light whose future is guaranteed. He is the part of natural order and he must be kept in continous relation with natural and social processes. If men are to realize values progressively, they cannot escape the contingencies of experience; they must be in face-to-face relation with Nature and society and must act purposefully in meeting the problems and tensions, which such direct relations yield. Evil for pragmatism is the failure to stand up to life in this way and face the situations, which our experiences present. Any inhibitions or conventional structures, which prevent society from honesty facing its onward-moving demands, are also evil. Most social evils are rooted in some outworn social scheme, which persists with us by sheer weight of inertia, to superimpose artificial barriers, which prevent free and purposeful action. Modern society no longer needs human slaves, because the machine is our new slave, which maintains our existence and frees us for the meaningful pursuits of life.
Science and Religion co-exist The whole
movement of pragmatism aims to recognize the
inseparable connection between rational cognition and
rational purpose. As some kind of a mediating philosophy,
pragmatism aims to explain and prove that science
and belief, (I would like to claim it to be religion since
pragmatism was originally rooted on European
philosophy which if you can recall, this would be the time
of the saints or the medieval philosophers whose philosophy
generally revolved on the theme of God). The contributors
namely Dewey, James, Pierce, and others would not take an
extremist position: either science is the fad and theology
is archaic. They instead seek ways to prove that knowledge
(which is the scientific experimentation) and belief (which
would be religion) are actually partners and supporters in
real life. They move in the same framework/system.
Why is
there a gap between science and religion? How did it come
about? It was during
the reformation in the 16th century when the people began to
lose confidence in the Church. Truly, the church had been
imposing unnecessary fines and implementing absurd orders,
it opposed capitalism and any discovery that would imperil
the dogmas of the church. This came to the point where the
church itself began to twist its aim and to stray away from
its nature and vision. At this point also, the people began
to doubt the credibility and power of the chuch. They began
to explore new possibilities, develop new systems, and they
also began to experiment, thereby leading to the development
of modern science, or what they referred to as scientific
experimentation. At this point, knowledge, which used to
always be defined in the context of the divine God during
the Medieval period, now becomes anthropocentric, putting
"nature on the rack." Those that could be considered as true
are only those that can be verified through scientific
experimentation.
Robbins, J. Wesley. "Pragmatism,
Critical Realism, and the Cognitive Value of Religion and
Science." Zygon 34.4 (December 1999): 655-666. The subject of focus for this essay is a comparison of Kaufman and James in relation to pragmatic tests for religious claims. What makes a religious claim true? We must first note, before we continue, that both James and Kaufman do not give an explicit answer to this question. However, each theologian presupposes a world that determines what counts as true, thus implicitly giving us an answer to our question. ….(theory points)………To believe in God is to long for His existence and, further, it is to act as if He existed; it is to live by this longing and to make it the inner spring of our action. . James, William, Pragmatism, Hackett Publishing Company, United States of America, 1981.
www.gac.edu/oncampus/academics
PRAGMATISM AND
ONTOLOGY Taking a very
different perspective, in process ontology the real "stuff" This ontology
leads to the perhaps startling realization that the notion In a universe
conceived of as open, the question of knowledge must be NelsonEssay ... Donna
Haraway (1997) and pragmatist ontology by philosopher
Linda Alcoff (1996 ... James,
PRAGMATISM AND
AXIOLOGY It concerns with theories of values There are two major divisions of Axiology
(What is evil and good?) 2- Aesthetics What is beautiful and ugly? Some terms relate
with axiology such as pessimism, optimism, hedonism, egoism, and
altruism.
http://www.cals.ncsu.edu Although the problem of values seems to be older than philosophy itself and had appeared already in the oldest mythical and religious texts, Axiology as a special philosophical topic seems to be a rather recent development. In contrast to thinkers such as Oskar Kraus, for whom the theory of values owes its emergence to the Greek philosophers - in particular the Presocratics - others, like Barry Smith and Alan Thomas, tend to speak about three axiological currents: the American Pragmatism of Dewey and Lewis, the Austrian-German phenomenological tradition (F. Brentano, A. Meinong, E. Husserl, M. Scheler, N. Hartmann), and the British axiological tradition (G. E. Moore, H. Rashdall, W. D. Ross). There are in fact two different concepts of Axiology - a broader one, which understands Axiology as a theory of values in a general sense, and a narrow one, which regards Axiology as a strong theory of values, forming a special field of research. With this strict concept the question arises, how Axiology could be distinguished from the other fields of philosophy. Three important statements stand in to the foreground:
http://ag.philo.at/~iaf On criticism the pragmatism, other Butler says, values have their existence rather by virtue of their relation with individual-social activities. They have existence to the extent that they function in, or accompany effective functioning in, the individual-social flow of events. Pragmatic axiology is not based upon desire alone; it does not define value as that which fulfills desire in a purely subjective or selfish way. Its treatment of value is at the same time more critical, more objective, and less personal than this. Pragmatic axiology, in antithesis to this, insists that there must be critical examination of values in order for wise selections to be made, and that wisdom involves ascending to the level criticism at which a consistent principle of selection is operative. On the other hand, ethical value, aesthetic value, religious values, social values etc, do not have supernatural basis. Overall, all values are acceptable, if they are beneficial for individual or collectively.
Although the problem of values seems to be older than philosophy itself and had appeared already in the oldest mythical and religious texts, Axiology as a special philosophical topic seems to be a rather recent development. In contrast to thinkers such as Oskar Kraus, for whom the theory of values owes its emergence to the Greek philosophers - in particular the Presocratics - others, like Barry Smith and Alan Thomas, tend to speak about three axiological currents: the American Pragmatism of Dewey and Lewis, the Austrian-German phenomenological tradition (F. Brentano, A. Meinong, E. Husserl, M. Scheler, N. Hartmann), and the British axiological tradition (G. E. Moore, H. Rashdall, W. D. Ross). There are in fact two different concepts of Axiology - a broader one, which understands Axiology as a theory of values in a general sense, and a narrow one, which regards Axiology as a strong theory of values, forming a special field of research. With this strict concept the question arises, how Axiology could be distinguished from the other fields of philosophy. Three important statements stand in to the foreground:
http://ag.philo.at/~iaf
Minteer, Ben A. "Intrinsic Value for
Pragmatists?" Environmental Ethics 23.1 (April 2001): 57-75. Abstract: Conventional wisdom suggests that environmental pragmatists balk at the mere mention of intrinsic value. Indeed, the leading expositor of the pragmatic position in environmental philosophy, Bryan Norton, has delivered withering criticisms of the concept as it has been employed by nonanthropocentrists in the field. Nevertheless, I believe that Norton has left an opening for recognition of intrinsic value in his arguments, albeit a version that bears little resemblance to most of its traditional incarnations. Drawing from John Dewey's contextual approach toward moral inquiry, I offer a reconstructed notion of intrinsic value that avoids the metaphysical pitfalls identified by Norton. I argue that this contextual understanding of noninstrumental claims has the advantage of turning our attention toward, and not away from, the critical realm of practice and policy, and that it is especially compatible with the norms of democratic deliberations. By way of example and in defense of my position, I conclude with a rejoinder to Holmes Ralston’s claims about the role of foundational intrinsic value commitments in settling the human-nature dilemma at Royal Chitwan National Park in Nepal (F-web) PRAGMATISM AND EPISTEMOLOGY “Knowledge is a function of association and communication; it depends upon tradition, upon tools and methods socially transmitted, developed and sanctioned. “-- John Dewey Pragmatism builds on the intuition that experience is the proving ground in which the worth of things is made plain. Therefore, “Experience is the real test of all things" Pragmatist does have a theory of reality, and it is greatly devoted to the study of values. In fact, its concern for epistemology, far from being an academic interest in the riddle of knowledge, is basically a concern to make things work and so to realize present value. It is nearly correct to say that pragmatism is primarily a theory of knowledge. It should be made clear at the outset that the pragmatist treatment of knowledge does not fit the traditional pattern of philosophy. We must therefore forsake labels such as rational or empirical, and inductive or deductive, certainly in the beginning. The most likely approach is to contrast pragmatic knowledge theory with these traditional forms of analysis, especially with rationalism and empiricism. In PRAGMATISM COMPARED TO RATIONALISM, pragmatism is not rationalistic. It does not begin with universal truth or principles and then deduce specific items of knowledge from these. It regards experience as radically specific and particular. Yet there is a rational element in the pragmatic treatment of knowledge, which saves it, as, shall see, from getting lost in the forest of infinite particulars. Sheer facts themselves do not constitute knowledge for the pragmatists. According to Pragmatists, it is evidently not a universal truth or principle. As compare to rationalism, it is an inductive generalization formulated after a great number of individuals have been studied. In PRAGMATISM COMPARED TO EMPIRICISM, it must be said that pragmatism in not empirical in the traditional sence. First, pragmatism does not think of the senses as gateways for knowledge and of sense perception as a passive affair of receiving impressions from the outside world. In addition, pragmatism does not regard any compilation of facts as constituting knowledge, even when those facts are yielded either by sensation or by such refined sensation as scientific observation. pragmatism is empirical in that its frame of reference is always sense-perceptual experience, not predisposed principles of reason but not empirical in a way which assumes that sensation yields ready-made facts, like neorealism, or that there is any virtue in an accumulation of a fund of scientific knowledge derived from observation. Therefore, it denies the traditional empiricism. Pragmatism is not purely empirical in its understanding of sense perception. Pragmatism is closer to idealism in its epistemology than to realism. For pragmatism, there is no simple intersection of knower and object, from which direct knowledge results. We know that Francis Bacon in 16th and 17th century made a rather successful revolt against deductive logic. In place of deduction and the syllogism, he argued men to banish the idols of the mind and study Nature directly by the observation. Therefore, it can be concluded that pragmatic knowledge not an accumulation of facts. While having an eye for facts, pragmatism rejects fact accumulation, the acquisition of a storehouse of knowledge, as a vice rather than a virtue. EXPERIMENTAL METHOD Pragmatic method is proposed by its supporters as nothing more than a conscious formulation of what goes on all the time in our experience, and has gone on in human experience for centuries. Most of the pragmatic knowledge based on the testing and experimental methods etc. It yields two things: 1- Knowledge, to the limited extent of a sense of the particular way of acting which is acceptable in particular unit of experience, and 2- Value, to the extent that there is action in addition to judgment or conclusion, and something is done which yields changes and brings needed results.
Concerned with theories of the nature of knowledge Epistemological questions: o how do people learn? o What knowledge is of utmost value? o What are the different types of knowledge? o What are the educational goals of agricultural education and extension?
John Dewey, the founder of the school of philosophy known as Pragmatism and the father of modern education (known as progressive education), was one such critic openly hostile to reason and independent thought. "The mere absorbing of facts and truths is so exclusively individual an affair that it tends very naturally to pass into selfishness. There is no obvious social motive for the acquirement of mere learning, there is no clear social gain in success thereat" (John Dewey, The School and Society). The progressive schools, which follow in Dewey's philosophical footsteps (and whose strands of philosophical thought are heavily entwined in New Zealand's education system), socialize the child by discouraging individual effort and immersing him in the group, or, to use Ayn Rand's words, by "throwing him to the pack." Mobile pragmatism: epistemology on the run Pim Haselager The historically dominant, Cartesian, tradition in epistemology views the mind as collections of ideas and proceeds on the basis of a conception of knowledge that is characterized by truth and absolute certainty. This standard epistemological position has provided the philosophical background for the use of symbolic representations in classical cognitive science. Connectionism presents a first step in the departure from the classical conception of cognition. The resulting debate about the nature of information representation is intensified by the growing influence of dynamical systems theory and mobile robot research. Suggestions have been made to model cognitive processes (even the so-called higher ones like categorization and deliberation) based on an extremely fluid, time-dependent form of representation or even without using representations at all. However, the many different suggestions currently being made are unified only by a common dismissal of classical cognitive science. It is suggested that a consideration of an alternative epistemological position, called pragmatism, might remedy the current lack of coherence of this counter-movement. Pragmatism rejects the standard view in epistemology by redirecting attention to the purposes for which an organism needs to represent information and proposes an action-related characterization of knowledge. Thus, pragmatism might help to provide the conceptual tools that will support a coherent conception of information-representation necessary for the 'satisfying' behavior of mobile systems.
Cull, Ryan E. "The Betrayal of Pragmatism?
Rorty's Quarrel with James." Philosophy and Literature 24.1
(April 2000): 83-95. Abstract: After
having staunchly defended William James for many years, Richard
Rorty suddenly argues in "Religious Faith, Intellectual
Responsibility and Romance" that William James "betrayed his own
pragmatism" in "The Will to believe". By
overlooking and misinterpreting the rhetorical strategies of
James, Rorty's essay is characteristic of his own recent
tendency to turn away from the intellectual pluralism that lies
at the heart of pragmatism. The continued
relevance of pragmatism in intellectual debate
depends (contra Rorty) upon James's insight that we ought to
care less about the source of a given theory and more about
whether it can help us solve a particular
problem.
Pape, Helmut. "The Unity of Classical
Pragmatism: it’s Scope and Its Limits." In
The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of
Philosophy, vol. 8: Contemporary Philosophy,
ed. Daniel Dahlstrom (Bowling Green, Ohio: Philosophy
Documentation Center, 2000), pp. 233-244.
Heelan, Patrick A. and Jay Schulkin.
"Hermeneutical Philosophy and Pragmatism: A
Philosophy of Science." Synthese 115.3 (1998): 269-302.
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